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sentimentalism and romanticism of the dilettante. The man of real gifts is so sure that his product possesses independent worth—just because it is so satisfying to him—that he is inclined to be impatient when asked to prove its “social” value. But at the same time, the possibility of being “good for something,” though it does not create originally the persuasion of significance, is apparently needed if an intelligent being is to be able to justify his course to disinterested thoughts; and this will mean, with human nature constituted as it is, some measure at least of social usefulness. The man who feels an inner call to paint pictures would, I think, ordinarily be adjudged foolish if, on a purely abstract computation that the ministry contributes more per individual to the general happiness, he were to make himself a preacher instead. But if on scrutiny *some* advantage to his fellows were not discoverable in his choice, and all its benefits were to be absorbed by his own insignificant self, doubts could hardly fail to enter his mind about its wisdom, and that too from the standpoint of his own permanent satisfaction in it. Thus art sometimes takes directions whose triviality and lack of large human value compel a new insistence on art’s “social” function, until it is brought back to lines more capable of standing the test of reflective significance.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy. ISAAC HUSIK. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. l + 462. 1916.

Dr. Husik's book is the first attempt in the English language to present completely the history of medieval Jewish philosophy. It covers a period of six centuries, from the ninth to the fifteenth, which for the author mark the beginning and the end of systematic speculation among Jewish thinkers. An introduction of fifty pages is devoted to a study of the external influences which molded Jewish thought. There is an excellent exposé of Aristotle and a brief but thorough study of the Arabic schools.

Dr. Husik finds an Arabic prototype for every Jewish philosopher, even for Jehuda Halevi, the nationalist philosopher who rebelled against all foreign influence. He classifies the Jewish philosophers into Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists, and Aristotelians, and upon the basis of this classification he unfolds before us the development of medieval Jewish thought. He starts with Israeli as the first Jewish philosopher—an honor usually attributed to Saadya—and ends with

Albo as the last Jewish scholastic, a thinker who, in the author's judgment, does not fully deserve the fame he has enjoyed. Dr. Husik finds in Crescas the cue even to what is considered Albo's most essential contributions, namely, the fundamental dogmas and the reduction of the thirteen articles of faith to three. Maimonides is given by Dr. Husik a lesser place than he is wont to occupy. Ibn Daud, who has been almost forgotten, is given by Dr. Husik a great deal of the credit usually accorded to Maimonides. The author thinks that "if not for Ibn Daud there would have been no Maimonides." He finds several flaws in Maimonides's system and shows that "Maimonides the rationalist often forgot his own ideal of reason and enlightenment."

The mystical philosophers and the exponents of the Kabala are purposely omitted. Dr. Husik limits himself to Jewish rationalism, probably because he thinks that the Kabala deserves no place in the history of philosophy. It is regrettable, however, that he did not indicate the relation of the Kabala to rationalism, and the rôle it played in Jewish life.

Numerous scientific notes, a list of biblical and talmudic quotations, an index and an extensive bibliography are appended to the book. The only work of importance omitted in the bibliography is Ahad Ha'am's essay on Maimonides, which presents Maimonides in a novel light. Those familiar with the scattered, obscure, and unintelligible material with which Dr. Husik had to cope, can best appreciate the value of his excellent work. He has transformed a literary chaos into a systematic presentation, accessible to the modern reader. His study of the texts is deep and thorough; and his clear, simple, and concise style stands in contrast with the obscure interpretations in German, which are often more unintelligible than the original.

The attempts at complete histories of Jewish philosophy have been so few that one can hardly find a basis for comparison. Dr. Husik's history differs from that of Neumark both in its scope and in its aim. Dr. Husik aims to present to us the past, without any reference to present-day thought; while Dr. Neumark seeks to construct a new system of Jewish philosophy, and reads the history of Jewish philosophy in the light of this system. Dr. Husik seems to be more interested in the similarity between Jewish thought and the outer environment, while Neumark—and in this he is the only one—seeks for the Jewish keynote. But he attunes it a great deal to Kantianism.

There is a closer connection between Dr. Husik's and Bernfeld's history of Jewish philosophy in Hebrew. But Dr. Husik's is more scientific and accurate in the renderings of the texts. Bernfeld has

the ensemble more at heart, but he overlooks essential details, and his references are not always traceable. Besides, he infuses into the Jewish philosophers his own view of a religious philosophy. Dr. Husik, on the other hand, has the merit of being impartial and objective. It is true that in the introduction he expounds his own theories of Jewish philosophy, but he makes no effort to incorporate them in the body of his book. Had he viewed history less objectively, he might have been led to overlook some important characteristics, which contradict to a certain extent some of the theories which he expounds.

The introduction carefully avoids the term "Jewish Philosophy," and uses instead paraphrases such as "the philosophical movement in Medieval Jewry," "the intellectual horizon of medieval Jewry," "the history of Jewish thought," or "medieval Jewish literature," etc. But the content of the book, the faithful portrayal of Halevi, Crescas, and others, do not tend to make us share the author's implied belief that Jewish philosophy has no individuality of its own. One is rather impressed by the overemphasis on the foreign elements. Because the Arabic thinker "Algazali too attacked the philosophers on their own ground and found his consolation in the asceticism and mysticism of the Sufis," does it necessarily follow that he was the prototype of Halevi? The similarity between the two is more an outward one. This is not the place to point out the essential differences, but Algazali's philosophy is based on a religious mysticism, while Halevi's is the expression of a poetical nationalism. It is not Algazali, but the inner yearnings of the nation, that were the source of inspiration to Jehuda Halevi, as well as to the other Jewish philosophers. But Dr. Husik assumes that throughout the period of his investigation the philosophical stimulus came from without, and that the system of Judaism was the same for all, without any individual variation. And yet the rational Judaism of Saadya is distinct from the spiritual Judaism of Bachya; the national and historical Judaism of Jehuda Halevi differs from the static Judaism of Maimonides; the emotional Judaism of Nachmanides from the impersonal Judaism of Gabirol and Ibn Ezra; the intellectual Judaism of Gersonides from the mechanical Judaism of Crescas. And those Jewish philosophers, such as Israeli, Gabirol, and Ibn Daud, who did not take a definite attitude towards Judaism, or did not distinguish themselves by some great Halachic work, were neglected and forgotten, even though they equaled in rank the foremost scholastics.

A classification of the Jewish philosophers, based on the inner life rather than on the process of intellectual assimilation, would have been a better tool for the construction of history. If instead of the usual various classifications, we were to group the Jewish

philosophers into, let us say, nationalists and assimilators, conservatives and radicals, we should immediately get a truer glimpse of the inner struggles which have characterized Jewish thought from the talmudic to the present time.

But the fallacy that there is no Jewish philosophy proper has become such a universal and crystallized axiom, that even as deep and original a scholar as Dr. Husik proceeded on this assumption. We can best account for this deep-rooted fallacy when we bear in mind that the study of Jewish philosophy started in the nineteenth century, at the time of the Jewish emancipation—a movement characterized by a desire for self-obliteration. This desire was carried back to history. The same impulse denied the national existence as well as its intellectual reflection in abstract thought. As a sequel to the belief that there are only Jewish individuals, but no Jewish people, came the belief that there were only individual Jewish philosophers, but no Jewish philosophy. This view also explains the fact, which is otherwise inexplicable, that although a number of monographs have been written on individual Jewish philosophers, there are very few complete historical presentations. The first history of Jewish philosophy, that of Bernfeld, 1897, appeared with the rise of the nationalistic movement. This was not a mere coincidence, but an organic outgrowth, and it is regrettable that the historians did not convert this significant fact into a useful tool. For Jewish philosophy can not be separated from Jewish history and literature.

Dr. Husik was more interested in the logical and technical aspect of the subject. Not that he did not fathom the other aspect or that he lacked penetration, but he assigned himself certain limits beyond which he did not care to go. And in his self-imposed task, he has been most successful. His history will serve as an excellent textbook both for the layman and for the scholar. Its objective character makes it most valuable to all, independently of one's philosophy of the history of philosophy.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. May, 1917. *The Relation of Coherence to Immediacy and Specific Purpose* (pp. 259–273) : BERNARD BOSANQUET.—A reply to Professor Sabine's article, "Professor Bonsanquet's Logic and the Concrete Universal." Explains the kind of evidence on which the primacy of coherence rests, defends the coherence theory against objections from the side of realism and pragmatism, and further expounds the theory from the